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Abstract
The aim of the current study was to determine whether the level of generosity shown by 3- to 8-year-old children (N = 136; M
age = 69 months) in a resource distribution task would vary according to whether the recipient had previously displayed kind
(affection and generosity) and/or non-kind (non-affection and non-generosity) behavior towards a third party. We first asked
whether donor children would show higher levels of generosity towards an affectionate than a non-affectionate recipient (con-
dition 1), and a generous than a non-generous recipient (condition 2), before pitting the two forms of recipient kindness directly
against each other (condition 3). Last, we asked whether donations to generous recipients would decrease if the recipient
simultaneously displayed non-kind behavior through a lack of affection (condition 4). Here we show that children allocated a
greater share of the available resource to generous and affectionate recipients than non-generous and non-affectionate recipients
respectively. However, when asked to divide resources between a generous and an affectionate recipient, or two recipients who
had each displayed a combination of kind and non-kind behavior, children allocated each recipient an equal share of the resource.
These findings suggest that children donate selectively based on previous information regarding recipient generosity and affec-
tion, however when both forms of kindness are pitted directly against each other, children strive for equality, suggesting that
kindness engenders donor generosity irrespective of the form of kindness previously displayed.
Keywords Resource distribution . Selective prosocial donating . Recipient characteristics . Indirect reciprocity
Behaving prosocially, that is acting to benefit others, is wide-
spread amongst humans, with extreme levels of self-sacrifice,
such as charitable donations to anonymous strangers frequent-
ly occurring (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). The human capac-
ity to cooperate, to help, and to share resources with others,
contributes to the success of our socially motivated species,
and, in part, facilitates our ability to live harmoniously in large
social groups (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). Unlike other
species, humans frequently act prosocially not only to kin, but
also to non-kin and even strangers (Daniel et al. 2015;
Trommsdorff et al. 2007), a proclivity towards maintaining
cooperation that is so strong that group members who display
antisocial behavior are often punished or ostracized from the
group (Herrmann et al. 2008; Kenward and Östh 2015;
Korsgaard et al. 2010). Psychologists have long been interest-
ed in the developmental origins of such prosociality, with
studies revealing complex developmental trajectories
(Eisenberg and Fabes 1998), in which a capacity to help and
cooperate, emerges before the ability to share resources
(Brownell et al. 2013; House et al. 2012; Paulus and Moore
2014).
The developing capacity to share resources with others has
recently stimulated a great deal of interest within the develop-
mental literature, with researchers asking whether, and when,
children show generosity in the distribution of resources. To
address such questions, researchers have employed a variety
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of tasks adapted from those used in economic decision-
making games, including simplified versions of the dictator
and ultimatum games (e.g., Benenson et al. 2007; Blake and
Rand 2010; Gummerum et al. 2008, 2010; Harbaugh and
Krause 2000), and the prosocial choice test (e.g., Brownell
et al. 2009; Claidiere et al. 2015; Dahlman et al. 2007; Fehr
et al. 2008; House et al. 2012, 2013; Schmitz et al. 2015). The
most common, although not exclusive (e.g., House et al.
2012), developmental pattern witnessed across tasks is one
in which children become increasingly generous with age
(e.g., Benenson et al. 2007; Blake and Rand 2010; Brownell
et al. 2009; Gummerum et al. 2010), a pattern that is most
evident in situations where the donor pays no direct or relative
cost for their generosity (e.g., Dahlman et al. 2007; Fehr et al.
2008; Thompson et al. 1997). However, when presented with
an unequal outcome that favors the recipient, donor children
frequently opt for egalitarianism rather than generosity, an
avoidance of inequality that becomes increasingly prevalent
throughout early childhood (e.g. Fehr et al. 2008).
In addition to detailing whether, and when, children show
generosity in their resource allocations, recent research has
begun to examine young children’s capacity for ‘selective
prosociality’. A suite of studies have shown that young chil-
dren vary their level of generosity depending on characteris-
tics of the recipient, including ingroup membership, moral
deservedness, friendship, neediness, and status (Baumard
et al. 2012; Malti et al. 2015; McGuigan et al. 2016).
Specifically, children share more often with friends and high
status individuals, than disliked peers and low status individ-
uals, providing there is no personal cost for doing so
(McGuigan et al. 2016; Moore 2009; Paulus and Moore
2014). Similarly, within the context of group membership, 3-
to 8-year-old children donate more favorably to ingroup than
outgroup members, with 7- and 8-year-olds also demonstrat-
ing an ingroup preference when incurring a personal cost for
doing so (Fehr et al. 2008). Age-related selectivity has also
been revealed with respect to moral deservedness and needi-
ness, with both 4- and 8-year-old children allocating a greater
share of an available resource to morally deserving and needy
recipients, with 8-year-olds also allocating a substantially de-
creased share of the resource to a morally underserving recip-
ient (Malti et al. 2015; Neldner et al. 2018). Taken together,
these findings show that as early as the preschool period
young children are selective donors, who adjust their level
of generosity according to a variety of recipient characteris-
tics, and that such generosity becomes increasingly selective
as donors age.
Olson and Spelke (2008) employed a novel variation of the
resource distribution paradigm in order to examine the evolu-
tionary propensities, and social experiences, that may
underpin young children’s selective prosociality. More specif-
ically, Olson and Spelke employed a ‘forced choice recipient’
paradigm that required 3½-year-old children to distribute, on
behalf of a donor doll, a fixed number of resources between
four recipient dolls. Of interest was whether young children’s
allocation decisions were influenced by three propensities that
evolutionary theory would suggest favor the emergence of
cooperation in humans: genetic relatedness, direct reciprocity,
and indirect reciprocity. According to evolutionary theory, do-
nors should allocate a greater share of an available resource to
close kin (Hamilton 1964), to individuals who have shared
with them previously (direct reciprocity: A helps B because
B has helped A previously; Trivers 1971), and to individuals
who have previously shared with others (indirect reciprocity:
A helps B because B is known to have helped C previously;
Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Trivers 1971). Olson and Spelke
introduced the possibility of reciprocity by allowing the par-
ticipants to observe, prior to making their allocation decision,
a demonstration in which each recipient was observed either
giving, or not giving, a resource to a third party. The benefi-
ciary of the generous behavior in the demonstration was var-
ied (directed to either the ‘donor’ doll or a neutral doll)
allowing the opportunity for direct and indirect reciprocity.
The results showed that as well as donating preferentially to
kin, 3½-year-old children demonstrated both forms of reci-
procity, donating with high levels of generosity to recipients
who had shared with the donor doll previously (direct reci-
procity), and to recipients who had been observed sharing
with the neutral doll (indirect reciprocity). Thus, when distrib-
uting resources amongst a fixed number of recipients, chil-
dren’s allocation decisions appear to be influenced by expo-
sure to information regarding the recipient’s prior behavior.
The aim of the current study was to utilize the ‘forced
choice recipient’ paradigm employed by Olson and Spelke
(2008) to determine whether reciprocal displays of generosity
vary in response to two different forms of kindness (generos-
ity in the form of sharing and affection in the form of hug-
ging). In contrast to Olson and Spelke who provided donors
only with information regarding recipient behavior that was
related to the context of resource distribution (i.e., the recipi-
ent’s history of generosity), we included demonstrations in
which the recipient’s prior behavior was either related (i.e.,
the donor observed the recipient’s prior level of
(non)generosity towards a third party) or unrelated (i.e., the
donor observed the recipient’s prior level of (non) affection
towards a third party) to resource distribution. Our main mo-
tivation in making this contrast was to determine whether the
reputation monitoring that is believed to underpin indirect
reciprocity is best established through ‘payment-in-kind’
(i.e., a resource-for-a resource payment structure), or whether
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any positive reputation can result in generosity from a donor
(i.e., a resource-for-kindness payment structure). If as theo-
rized, indirect reciprocity leads to cooperation through an ex-
pectation of future help, that is based on previous experiences/
interactions with other individuals (Rutte and Taborsky 2007),
then it may be the case that prior displays of generosity would
be a more accurate predictor of future generosity than
affection.
It is also possible that the strength of the cooperative repu-
tation that is established by engaging in observable acts of
kindness varies according to how costly that behavior is per-
ceived to be by observers. Costly signaling theory proposes
that observable displays of costly prosocial acts are used by
individuals to advertise a cooperative reputation, a reputation
that benefits the ‘displaying’ individual through improved ac-
cess to cooperative relationships and greater cooperation with-
in these relationships (Barclay and Willer 2007; Bradley et al.
2018). It may be that public displays of generosity in which
the individual incurs a direct cost as a consequence of their
kindness (i.e., the loss of a resource) sends a more powerful
signal of cooperative intent than does a public display of af-
fection which by comparison is relatively low cost. Thus, by
introducing two different forms of kindness into the context of
resource distribution we aimed to provide novel insight into
whether indirect reciprocity is underpinned by a highly spe-
cific, or more generalized, notion of reputation that is related
to the perceived cost of the action.
More specifically, we first asked whether children would
demonstrate a general preference for donating to a kind recip-
ient than a non-kind recipient (affectionate vs. non-
affectionate recipient; generous v non-generous recipient), be-
fore pitting the two different forms of kindness against each
other (generous vs. affectionate recipient). In our final condi-
tion, by employing combinations of kind/non-kind behaviors,
we aimed to determine, whether any preferential donating
shown towards a generous recipient would decrease if the
recipient simultaneously displayed non-kindness (a lack of
affection). It was predicted that participants would allocate a
greater share of the available resource to a kind than a non-
kind recipient irrespective of the form of kindness on display
(affection or generosity). When generous and affectionate re-
cipients were pitted directly against each other, we predicted
that the participants would allocate a greater share of the avail-
able resource to the generous recipient, as prior displays of
generosity provided the donor with information that was re-
lated to the context of resource distribution. In our final com-
parison, we predicted that children would donate preferential-
ly to a generous, but non-affectionate, recipient than to a non-
generous, but affectionate recipient, as the generous recipi-
ent’s prior level of generosity when distributing resources
would take precedence over kindness displayed in a different,
less relevant, form. Finally, we predicted that there would be
age differences in donating behavior with older children dem-
onstrating greater levels of selectivity in their donating deci-
sions than the younger children.
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty-six (68 males) 3- to 8-year-old chil-
dren (M age = 69.06 months, range = 35 to 106 months, SD =
19.45 months) were allocated to one of four conditions (see
Table 1 for a full breakdown of participant information). An
additional 38 children were excluded from the study due to
having failed the training phase (N = 8), having provided in-
correct answers to the comprehension check in the demonstra-
tion phase (N = 22), or having become distracted during the
experiment (N = 8). Participants were predominantly
Caucasian and were recruited from kindergarten and elemen-
tary schools in Scotland, UK that served a broad socioeco-
nomic area. Informed consent was obtained from the parent/
legal guardian of each child prior to their participation in the
study.
Design
In a between-participants design, children were assigned to
one of four conditions, in which they viewed two actors each
display kind (generous or affectionate) and/or non-kind (non-
generous or non-affectionate) behavior towards a third party.
Generous and non-generous behavior was evidenced by an
actor either donating, or withholding, a resource from a third
party, whereas affection and non-affection was evidenced by
an actor either hugging, or not hugging, a third party. In con-
ditions 1 and 2, we pitted a kind actor against a non-kind actor
(condition 1: affectionate (A+) actor vs. non-affectionate (A-)
actor; condition 2: generous (G+) actor vs. non-generous (G-)
actor), whereas in Condition 3 we pitted the two forms of
kindness directly against one another (affectionate (A+) actor
vs. generous (G+) actor). The fourth condition pitted together
a combination of both kind and non-kind behaviors, such that
one actor demonstrated themselves to be both affectionate and
non-generous (A+/G-), with the other actor displaying a lack
of affection but demonstrating generosity (A−/G+).
Each of the four conditions comprised three phases: a train-
ing phase, a demonstration phase, and a test phase (see Fig. 1
for an illustration of the task set-up in each phase). The train-
ing phase was designed to familiarize the participants with the
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task structure to be used in the test phase, and required the
participants to complete a series of trials in which they were
asked to allocate a single reward to one of two recipients
(different from those to be employed in the test phase).
Participants who successfully completed training moved to
the demonstration phase in which they observed two actors
each display a different set of kind and non-kind behaviors
towards a third party, with the specific behaviors on display
varying according to condition (1, 2, 3, or 4). Following the
demonstration phase, the participants undertook a test phase,
comprised of six trials, in which they were asked to allocate a
single reward to one of the two actors from the demonstration
phase (who now acted as recipients). The participants were
unaware of how many trials they would be required to com-
plete in the test phase.
Materials
The training phase required the use of two soft toys (a leopard
and an elephant), three identical sticker cups (one each for the
toys and the participant), and pairs of identical (sticker) re-
wards. The demonstration phase required the use of three soft
toys (two bears and a monkey) different to those used in the
training phase. The two bears, who differed only in the color
of their clothing acted out the behavioral characteristics of
interest in each of the four conditions, with the remaining
toy (a monkey) acting as the third party upon which the actors
bestowed their actions. In the three conditions (1, 3, & 4) that
involved the actor displaying generosity/non-generosity, the
item to be donated to (or withheld from) the third party was
a cardboard banana. The test phase employed the two actors
from the demonstration phase as recipients (the two bears), the
three sticker cups from the training phase (one for each of the
toys and the participant), and six pairs of identical sticker
rewards.
Procedure
Training Phase The training phase was designed to familiarize
the participants with the task structure that they would expe-
rience in the test phase (see Fig. 1 panel a). At the outset of
training, the participants were introduced to two toys, BThis is
leopard, and this is elephant^, that were positioned side-by-
side (position counterbalanced across trials) directly opposite
Training Phase










Donor G+ Actor G- Actor Donor
Fig. 1 Illustration of the task set-up used in the training, demonstration, and test phases. Note. Figure shows the configuration employed in condition 2
(generous (G+) vs. non-generous (G-) recipient
Table 1 Participant details broken down by condition (A+: Affectionate; A-: non-affectionate; G+: Generous; G-: non-generous) and age group.
Standard deviations are provided in parenthesis. M =Male, F = Female
Condition All ages 3 to 5 years 6 to 8 years
N M/F M Age N M/F M Age N M/F M Age
1 A+ vs. A- 34 15/19 68.09 (19.74) 19 8/11 53.74 (9.44) 15 7/8 86.27 (13.06)
2 G+ vs. G- 32 15/17 69.22 (19.95) 17 11/6 53.65 (9.60) 15 4/11 86.87 (12.15)
3 A+ vs. G+ 30 15/15 72.10 (20.51) 15 8/7 53.93 (8.85) 15 7/8 90.27 (9.26)
4 A−/G+ vs. A+/G- 40 23/17 67.48 (18.45) 25 14/11 54.84 (8.35) 15 9/6 88.53 (8.25)
Overall 136 68/68 69.06 (19.45) 76 41/35 54.12 (8.85) 60 27/33 87.98 (10.70)
Curr Psychol
the participant. Following the introductions, the experimenter
positioned a sticker cup in front of the participant and each of
the toys, then placed two identical stickers in the center of the
table. The participant was asked to select one sticker for them-
selves and to place it in their sticker cup, next they were asked
to choose which of the two toys should receive the remaining
sticker, BNow you can choose who to give the other sticker
to^. Once the participant had placed the sticker in the chosen
recipient’s sticker cup the experimenter checked for task un-
derstanding by asking the participant to indicate whether a
sticker had been allocated to each toy, BDoes elephant have
a sticker? Does leopard have a sticker?^ To proceed to the
demonstration phase the participants were required to indicate
correctly which toy had been allocated the sticker on two
consecutive trials (from a maximum of four).
Demonstration Phase In all four conditions the experimenter
acted out a scenario in which two actors (toy bears) engaged in
kind or non-kind (or a combination of the two) behavior(s)
towards a third party (a toy monkey). Within each condition
the behavior of each actor varied according to whether they
displayed (non) affection and/or (non)generosity (see Fig. 1
panel b). The experimenter indicated affection in an actor by
first moving the actor towards, and subsequently hugging, the
monkey, whereas a lack of affection was indicated by the actor
approaching, but not hugging, the monkey. In demonstrations
involving generosity, the actor carried a banana towards the
monkey, and either donated the banana to the monkey (gen-
erous actor) or kept the banana for themselves (non-generous
actor). To ensure that the participants did not have a general
preference for one toy bear over the other, the behavioral
characteristic(s) displayed by each of the toys during the dem-
onstration was counterbalanced across participants. As a com-
prehension check, upon completion of the demonstration each
participant was asked to recall the behavioral characteristic(s)
displayed by each of the two actors, e.g., BCan you show me
which teddy was sharing teddy, and which was not-sharing
teddy?^, with the order of questioning regarding the first and
second actor’s behavior counterbalanced.
Test Phase Once the demonstration was complete, the two
actors (hereafter, recipients A and B) were positioned directly
opposite the participant and a sticker cup was placed in front
of each (see Fig. 1 panel c). Following the same procedure
used in the training phase, the experimenter then placed two
identical stickers on the table and instructed the participant to
select one sticker for themselves and allocate the remaining
sticker to one of the two recipients, BNow you [the child] are
going to give out stickers again, you [the child] can keep one
and choose which teddy gets the other sticker .^ The partici-
pants completed six trials in the test phase, with each recipient
being positioned on both the left and right sides an equal
number or times (order randomized). To aid the participants’
task understanding the behavioral characteristic(s) displayed
by each actor during the demonstration were indicated verbal-
ly at the outset of each trial, e.g., BThis time sharing teddy
[generous actor] will go here and not-sharing [non-generous
actor] teddy will go here^.
Results
We present a series of increasingly detailed analyses that
aimed to determine whether children displayed a different
pattern of resource donation depending on the set of behav-
ioral characteristics displayed by each pair of recipients.
Within each of the four conditions we first asked whether
children donated a greater share of the available resource (6
stickers) to Recipient A or Recipient B, before considering
both the overall donating strategy (mean, prosocial, or egali-
tarian), and the trial-by-trial strategy adopted. Preliminary
analyses revealed that there was no effect of donor gender in
any of the four conditions therefore donor gender was exclud-
ed from all subsequent analyses.
Did Children Show Selective Resource Donation?
Of primary interest in the analysis was whether the partici-
pants would show a preference for one recipient over the other
when allocating rewards, and whether reward allocation fre-
quency varied according to the specific behavioral character-
istics displayed by each pair of recipients. When presented
with a choice to donate to either a kind or an non-kind recip-
ient children allocated a significantly greater proportion of the
rewards to the kind recipient in both condition 1 (M A+ = .59,
MA- = .41; two tailed binomial test: p = .009; see Fig. 2 panel
a) and condition 2 (M G+ = .59, M G- = .41; two tailed bino-
mial test: p = .017; see Fig. 2 panel b). However, the frequency
with which the children allocated rewards to the kind recipient
varied with donor age with the older children displaying a
preference for the affectionate recipient over the non-
affectionate recipient (6–8 years: M A+ = .61, M A- = .39;
two tailed binomial test: p = .045; see Fig. 2 panel a).
Whereas, the younger children preferred to donate to the gen-
erous recipient than the non-generous recipient (3–5 years:M
G+ = .66, M G- = .34; two tailed binomial test: p = .002; see
Fig. 2 panel b). In contrast, in conditions 3 and 4 when having
viewed two recipients each display a different form of kind-
ness (A+ vs. G+: condition 3), or having viewed two recipi-
ents each display a combination of both kind and non-kind
behaviors (A+/G- vs. A−/G+: condition 4), children from both
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age groups divided the resource equally between the two re-
cipients (see Fig. 2 panels c and d).
Did Children Employ Different Donation Strategies?
To more fully detail the way in which children allocated re-
sources within each condition, the total number of donations
made to Recipient Awere categorized into three different do-
nating strategies (prosocial, mean, or egalitarian). Those do-
nors who displayed a ‘mean’ donating strategy donated 0, 1,
or 2 rewards to A (i.e., A received fewer rewards than B),
those children who donated ‘prosocially’ allocated 4, 5, or 6
rewards to A (i.e., A received more rewards than B), with
those children who were ‘egalitarian’ donating 3 rewards to
both A and B. For the purposes of the analysis Recipient A
was deemed the affectionate recipient in condition 1, the gen-
erous recipient in condition 2, the affectionate recipient in
condition 3, and the affectionate/non-generous recipient in
condition 4. The donations made towards Recipient B were
not considered in the following analyses as B’s allocation was
the inverse of that allocated to A.
A chi square analysis that compared the number of children
displaying the three donation strategies in each of the four
conditions revealed that the pattern of donating differed sig-
nificantly across conditions (χ2(6) = 18.13, p = .005; see
Fig. 3). In order to determine where the condition differences
lay, we conducted a series of follow-up binomial tests that
compared the frequency with which each strategy was
employed in each condition. These analyses revealed that in
conditions 1(A+ vs. A-) and 2 (G+ vs. G-) the children were
equally likely to adopt a mean, an egalitarian, or a prosocial
strategy. The single exception occurred in condition 1 where
the children adopted a mean strategy significantly less often
than would be expected by chance (condition 1Mmean = .12;
two tailed binomial: p = .008; see Fig. 3). More detailed anal-
ysis of the donating behavior of the different age groups indi-
cated that the infrequent adoption of a mean approach in con-
dition 1 was primarily driven by the younger children (3–
5 years) who, in contrast to their older (6–8 years) counter-
parts, adopted a mean strategy significantly less often than
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Fig. 2 Proportion of trials in which the resource was donated to Recipient A and Recipient
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Condion
Fig. 3 Proportion of children that displayed each of the three patterns of
donating behavior towards Recipient A
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mean = .11; two tailed binomial: p = .048; see supplementary
Fig. 1).
In contrast to the donating pattern witnessed in conditions 1
and 2 the donors in both condition 3 (G+ vs. A+) and condi-
tion 4 (A+/G- vs. A−/G+) were significantly more likely to
adopt an egalitarian strategy (condition 3:M egalitarian = .57;
two tailed binomial: p = .012; condition 4:M egalitarian = .53;
two tailed binomial test: p = .016; see Fig. 3), and significantly
less likely to employ a prosocial strategy (condition 3: M
prosocial = .13; two tailed binomial test: p = .026; condition
4: M prosocial = .18; two tailed binomial test: p = .046; see
Fig. 3), than would be expected by chance. Analysis of the
approach adopted by the different age groups revealed that the
high levels of egalitarianism, and the lack of prosociality,
witnessed in condition 3 was primarily driven by the older
children who adopted an egalitarian strategy significantly
more often (condition 3: 6–8 years M egalitarian = .80; two
tailed binomial test: p < .001; see supplementary Fig. 2), and a
prosocial strategy significantly less often (condition 3: 6–
8 years M prosocial = .07; two tailed binomial test: p = .038;
see Supplementary Fig. 2) than would be expected by chance.
In contrast, the younger children were equally likely to adopt a
prosocial, an egalitarian, or a mean strategy in condition 3 (see
Supplementary Fig. 1). Neither the younger nor the older chil-
dren showed a donating strategy preference in condition 4 (see
Supplementary Figs. 1 & 2).
Did Children Alternate Resources between Recipients?
In addition to detailing whether children varied in their broad
approach to donation we were also interested in the way that
children allocated resources at the trial level. In instances
where the rewards were distributed equally between the two
recipients, equality could have been achieved in a variety of
ways: 1) by allocating first A and then B, three rewards
(AAABBB), 2) alternating the recipient of the reward on ev-
ery trial (e.g., ABABAB), or 3) a mixture of the two (e.g.,
ABBAAB). To determine whether, and if so, how frequently
children shifted their allocation between recipients we calcu-
lated an ‘alternation score’ for each child that could range
from 0 to 5. Higher scores reflected a greater tendency of the
donor to alternate between A and B, with those individuals
who achieved a score of 5 alternating between A and B on
every trial, and those individuals who never alternated receiv-
ing a score of 0.
The frequency with which the participants alternated their
donations was examined using a univariate ANOVAwith each
donor’s alternation score (0–5) as the dependent variable, and
condition (1, 2, 3, or 4) and age group (3–5 years or 6–8 years)
as the between participants factors. The analysis revealed a
significant main effect of condition (F(3,128) = 4.71,
p = .004, μ = .10; see Fig. 4), with follow-up post hoc Tukey
tests indicating that the donors in condition 2 (G+ vs. G- M
alternation = 2.50) alternated resources between recipients
significantly less often than the donors in both condition 3
(A+ vs. G+ M alternation = 3.67; p = .001) and condition 4
(A+/G- vs. A−/G+ M alternation = 3.40, p = .005). The anal-
ysis also revealed a significant main effect of age group
(F(1,128) = 6.891, p = .010, μ = .051), with the older children
(6–8 years M alternation = 3.48) alternating between recipi-
ents more frequently than the younger children (3–5 years M
alternation = 2.92), indicating an increased tendency of the
older children to maintain equality on a trial-by-trial basis.
To explore the influence of donor age on alternation fre-
quency in more detail we conducted a two further ANOVAs
(one for each age group). The analysis of the donating behav-
ior of the younger children revealed that the 3- to 5-year-olds
alternated at equivalent levels across conditions irrespective of
the combination of recipient characteristics displayed
(F(3,72) = 1.92, p = .13, μ = .07; see Fig. 4). In contrast, the
alternation pattern of the older children varied significantly
across conditions (F(3,56) = 5.03, p = .004, μ = .21; see Fig.
4). Follow up post hoc Tukey tests revealed that the 6- to 8-
year-olds alternated more frequently in condition 3 (A+ vs.
G+ M alternation = 4.47) than in condition 1 (A+ vs. A- M
alternation = 3.00, p = .004) and condition 2 (G+ v G- M =
2.73, p = .001), and more frequently in condition 4 (A+/G-
vs. A−/G+ M alternation = 3.73) than condition 2 (G+ vs. G-
M alternation = 2.73, p = .047; see Fig. 4). This donating pat-
tern suggests that when presented with two recipients who had
each displayed a form of kindness, in the context of an un-
known number of trials, the older, but not the younger, chil-
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Age group
Fig. 4 Mean number of alternating donationsmade to Recipients A and B
as a function of donor age
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Discussion
Previous studies have shown that preschool children can, in
some contexts, act generously when donating resources to
others (e.g., Brownell et al. 2009; Sebastián-Enesco et al.
2013), and that such generosity is on occasion displayed se-
lectively (e.g., Fehr et al. 2008; Moore 2009), before becom-
ing increasingly fine-grained, and less dependent on the out-
come for the donor themselves (e.g., Malti et al. 2015;
McGuigan et al. 2016). The current study built on this previ-
ous research by providing a novel test of indirect reciprocity in
which different forms of recipient (non) kindness were pitted
against each other. In line with predictions, when tasked with
distributing resources between a kind and a non-kind recipi-
ent, the donors allocated a significantly greater proportion of
the available resource to the kind recipient, irrespective of
whether the behavior on display was generosity or affection.
However, counter to predictions, when both recipients had
displayed kindness, either in isolation or in combination with
non-kindness, the donors distributed the resources equally be-
tween the recipients, suggesting that each form of kindness,
although varying in the direct cost incurred, was equally val-
ued by the observing individual. Indeed, the strength of the
drive towards equality in these latter instances was evidenced
at the trial level, where donors frequently maintained equality
on a trial-by-trial basis, in doing so strategically rewarding
each form of kindness displayed.
That children demonstrated elevated levels of generosity
towards kind recipients suggests that the donors were
bestowing a ‘reputation’ upon each recipient, a monitoring
process consistent with indirect reciprocity (Nowak and
Sigmund 2005). Indirect reciprocity involves individuals ac-
quiring, and acting upon, knowledge of their partner’s past
cooperative behavior (House et al. 2013), and comes in two
forms - upstream and downstream. Upstream reciprocity oc-
curs in instances where B responds to a helpful act received
from A by becoming more likely to direct a helpful act to-
wards C, whereas ‘downstream reciprocity’ occurs in those
instances where having helped B, A is more likely to be
helped by others (Nowak and Roch 2007). In the context of
the current study, the participants appeared to be engaging in
downstream reciprocity with the donor reciprocating the kind
recipient’s prior display of generosity or affection. This devel-
oping capacity to engage in downstream indirect reciprocity is
consistent with the results of previous studies that show indi-
rect reciprocity in resource distribution tasks (Olson and
Spelke 2008), and extends previous research to show that
indirect reciprocity can occur in response to displays of kind-
ness that are not related to resource distribution. The current
findings also add to the broad literature which suggests that
young children’s donating decisions are underpinned by a
variety of reciprocity mechanisms, including upstream indi-
rect reciprocity (Claidiere et al. 2015) and direct reciprocity
(Messer et al. 2017; House et al. 2013; Olson and Spelke
2008; Sebastián-Enesco et al. 2013; Warneken and
Tomasello 2013).
Moreover, the pattern of reciprocity witnessed in the cur-
rent study was influenced by the age of the donor. When
presented with both an affectionate and a non-affectionate
recipient 6- to 8-year-olds, but not 3- to 5-year-olds, allocated
a greater share of the resources to the affectionate recipient.
This donation pattern is consistent with a developmental tra-
jectory in which the older children were more aware of, and
were more likely to act upon, (non) kind recipient character-
istics than their younger counterparts, a finding that is consis-
tent with the age-related differentiation of sharing witnessed in
previous studies (e.g., Fehr et al. 2008; Malti et al. 2015;
McGuigan et al. 2016). In contrast, and somewhat surprising-
ly, the opposite pattern emerged with respect to recipient gen-
erosity, with the younger, but not the older, children allocating
a greater share of the resource to the generous recipient. These
age differences may have arisen as a consequence of the older
children viewing the resource as belonging to the actor, and
therefore regarding the withholding of the resource as justifi-
able. Indeed, consistent with this suggestion, recent studies
that employed an ‘ownership sorting paradigm’ demonstrated
an increasingly differentiated notion of self and other owner-
ship, coupled with an increased awareness of other ownership,
across the early years period (Cunningham et al. 2014).
In contrast to the developmental differences witnessed in
response to displays of kind versus non-kind behavior, the
pattern of performance in those conditions where the recipi-
ents both displayed kind behavior, appeared on the surface at
least, to be less influenced by donor age. Although children
from both age groups allocated an equal number of rewards to
each recipient, more detailed analysis of the broad strategy
adopted, and the trial-by-trial pattern of donation, suggests
that the donation decisions of the older children showed great-
er complexity. Specifically, the older children favored an egal-
itarian approach that was frequently underpinned by the alter-
nation of the reward recipient on a trial-by-trial basis, indicat-
ing a strategic attempt (across an unknown number of trials) to
maintain equality between two ‘equally worthy’ recipients.
This drive towards equality in our older participants is consis-
tent with recent resource distribution studies that demonstrat-
ed age-related increased aversion to inequity (Blake and
McAuliffe 2011), alongside a growing preference for egalitar-
ianism, ‘fairness’, and consideration of others (Fehr et al.
2008; Ongley et al. 2014), as well as with broad theories of
distributive justice (Damon 1975; Enright et al. 1984).
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Taken together, these age-related changes in generosity
suggest that the older children were basing their donating de-
cisions on a more generalized notion of reputation (including
considerations of both generosity and affection) than their
younger counterparts, whose notion of reputation appeared
highly restricted (i.e., actors were only shown generosity in
response to prior generosity). The developmental pattern
witnessed may be a consequence of the acquisition of com-
plex cognitive, social, emotional, and individual factors that
have yet to develop in the youngest participants. These factors
include advancements in theory-of-mind (Malti et al. 2015;
Wellman et al. 2001), an increased awareness of moral emo-
tion expectancies (Krettenauer et al. 2008), an increased
awareness of own reputation (Dana et al. 2006; Olson and
Spelke 2008), a greater capacity to respond with sympathy
(Malti et al. 2007, 2009), as well as through increased oppor-
tunity to acquire ‘fairness’ norms from individuals in their
social environment (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989). Future re-
search should usefully explore the relationship between the
developing cognitive and socio-cognitive abilities that under-
pin young children’s allocation decisions, and the ability of
young children to engage in the various forms of reciprocity
that underpin cooperation.
In sum, when asked to distribute rewards between two
recipients who each displayed different combinations of kind
and non-kind characteristics children’s donating decisions
were influenced both by the form of (non) kindness displayed
by the recipients and by the age of the donor themselves. That
our young donors engaged in indirect reciprocity, even in
instances where displays of kindness were unrelated to re-
source donation, provides support for accounts from the bio-
logical literature that propose an adaptive function for reputa-
tion monitoring in aiding cooperation between nonrelatives
within human social groups (Engelmann and Fischbacher
2009; Greiner and Levati 2005; Nowak and Sigmund 1998;
Seinen and Schram 2006). Through showing that young
humans, in simple one-shot interactions, can monitor, and
act upon, the behavior of third parties our study provides im-
portant insight into whether, and how, 3- to 8-year-old chil-
dren reciprocate kind actions. That such capacity for
reputation-based reciprocity is evident early in development
would appear to provide testament to the utility of down-
stream reciprocity in maintaining cooperation in human soci-
eties under conditions in which repeated interactions between
non-relatives may not be possible.
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